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“It is possible, possible, possible. It must 
Be possible. It must be that in time 
The real will from its crude compoundings come, 
 
Seeming, at first, a beast disgorged, unlike, 
Warmed by a desperate milk. To find the real, 
To be stripped of every fiction except one, 
 
The fiction of an Absolute.” 
 
-- Wallace Stevens, Notes toward a Supreme Fiction 
 
 
More Mathematico and More Hermetico 
 
Formulating a theory of signification doesn’t seem to be one of philosophy’s current 
preoccupations. Whether suffering from a malaise after the so-called linguistic turn, or placing its 
hopes on the algorithms of the future to figure out language’s “emergent properties,” the thinking 
of the sign seems to have lost most of  its vigor. Nevertheless, a theory of signification remains 
indispensable for contemporary efforts that depend on a certain proof of a philosophical absolute, 
the great outdoors of speculation. One could say that a consistent theory of signification is the 
sine qua non for any access to such an absolute, simply because it would always already be at the 
same time an absolute limit to language. We may refer to such a theory as a speculative theory of 
signification,1 whose core, I would argue, would consist in a clear distinction between the 
mathematical and the non-mathematical (philosophical, linguistic, poetic) sign. 
 To contextualize this issue of demarcation and its historical antecedents, we may turn to 
the quarrel between astronomer Johannes Kepler and mysticist Donald Fludd, between 
signification more mathematico and signification more hermetico.2 Kepler claimed that Fludd, 
together with other alchemists and hermeticists, constantly relied on analogies between 
macrocosm and microcosm, interpreting diagrams and formulas metaphorically, whereas true 
mathematicians like Kepler himself stayed away from such interpretative exuberance. This 
rigorous refusal of analogy and metaphor on one side and the delirium of interpretation on the 
other played out in other fields as well, specifically the field of language. We may place, for 
example, on the side of more mathematico the Leibnizian dream of a mathesis universalis, in 
which each philosophical proposition would be inaugurated with a calculemus. This line of 
thought extends right to modern times, with Frege’s idea for a “formula language for pure 
thought,”3 the Turing machine, and Montague grammar. Language here becomes ethereal, fully 
replaceable by abstract, empty signs and functions. On the other, “hermetic” side we may situate 
all attempts at finding the original, “arch-metaphorical,” symbolically charged language, for 
example in the Dutch work of Johannes Goropius Becanus, and more recently in Nicolay Marr’s 
“Japhetic Theory” of language, Kemal Atatürk’s “Sun-Language” system, or Petro Zheji’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Cf. Quentin Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative Analysis of the Meaningless Sign,” lecture 
at the Freie Unversität, Berlin, April 20, 2012, Robin Mackay (tr.): “I call ‘speculative’ every philosophy that claims 
[…] to attain […] an absolute.” Available at http://oursecretblog.com/txt/QMpaperApr12.pdf (accessed July 19, 2013). 
2 Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, London and New York, Routledge, 2002, p. 265. 
3 Gottlob Frege, “Begriffsschrift: A Formula Language, Modeled upon that of Arithmetic, for Pure Thought,” in Jean 
van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book of Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, Lincoln, iUnverse, 
1999, p. 6. 
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albanological work. All rely on an obsessive attention to the metaphorical meaning of individual 
letters and sounds.  
 Now, the position of philosophy in this debate remains ambiguous, with adherents of both 
sides making their contributions. Philosophy’s theories of signification, whether developed 
through the work of Aristotle, Leibniz, Saussure, Lacan, or Chomsky show the continuous marks 
of an, as for now, unresolvable argument between, once taken to their extremes, particularly close 
positions: a mos mathematicus aiming for a universal, abstract symbolic system that proceeds 
along purely mathematical lines, and a mos hermeticus working toward an arch-metaphorical, 
“original” language (which is therefore, paradoxically, also a universal, abstract symbolic 
system). There would therefore exist something like signification more philosophico -- a very 
unstable mode of signification indeed. Nevertheless, it is this mode, and no other, in which 
philosophical “proofs” are articulated. This is mode of signification which therefore constantly 
confronts the tension between under- and overinterpretation. 
 Returning to our initial question of the necessity of theory of signification for a certain set 
of proofs concerning the absolute and everything that would follow from such proofs -- a certain 
access to things-in-themselves, the destruction of “correlationism,” philosophical realisms -- I 
suggest that we start by reviewing the position of such a theory in the work of Alain Badiou. This 
is instructive to the extent that Badiou somehow manages a balance between the mos 
mathematicus and mos hermeticus by explicitly introducing the mos philosophicus as a properly 
citational mode. At the same time, Badiou’s work has provided the fundaments for the only 
extant contemporary proof of an absolute, as we will encounter in the work of Quentin 
Meillassoux.  
 As John Van Houdt and I have argued elsewhere, the citationality characteristic of 
Badiou’s philosophical discourse is anchored in his idea of philosophy’s “circulation” and its 
dependence on “truth procedures” such as mathematics and poetry to formulate philosophical 
propositions.4 The consequence, however, of this dependency on truth procedures external to 
philosophy itself is that philosophy always only cites and therefore potentially misquotes 
mathematics, and can never aspire to argue purely more mathematico, which would imply a 
disastrous suture between mathematics and philosophy. For Badiou, philosophy is an unstable, 
decentered circulation around a void, gravitating between the three poles of the poetry of the 
subject, the mathematics of ontology, and the history of philosophical discourse. By accepting the 
metaphorical quality of all philosophical discourse, as already analyzed in depth in Derrida’s 
essay “White Mythology,” Badiou therefore also excludes realism as a viable philosophical 
position. 
 The absence of a philosophy more mathematico -- not its impossibility tout court5 -- is 
both advantageous and disadvantageous for philosophy, depending one’s inclination. On the one 
hand, the impossibility of a pure philosophy more mathematico -- or, for example, as Spinoza 
desired, ordine geometrico demonstrata -- implies that it can never be refuted by mathematics on 
the basis of some misappropriation or category mistake6; because philosophy always only cites 
mathematics it necessarily misappropriates it to a certain extent. On the other hand this seems to 
imply that certain philosophical statements will remain unprovable, such as the existence of an 
absolute outside any theological or metaphysical predetermination. For in order to arrive at such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Cf. Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei and John Van Houdt, “Circulating Philosophy: A Note on Two Apparent 
Misquotations in Alain Badiou’s Logics of Worlds,” Theory and Event 14.2, 2011. 
5 It would be my claim that the only moment we will arrive at a pure philosophy more mathematico, a Leibnizian 
mathesis universalis, is the moment of the appearance of artificial intelligence, whose definition practically coincides 
with such philosophy: namely a bijective mapping of mathematics onto language. In this sense, AI is nothing but a 
different avatar of the death of philosophy, or, in Badiouan terms, a suture of mathematics to philosophy. 
6 I refer here specifically to philosophies that depend to a smaller or larger extent on arguments imported from 
mathematics. Naturally there are many philosophical positions which are inherently impervious to mathematical or 
mathematicalizing arguments. 
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proof one has to face precisely the glaring absence of a coherent speculative theory of 
signification, which in its weak version would claim an unequivocal demarcation between the 
philosophical and the mathematical, and in its strong version a subservience of the former to the 
latter. 
 
 
Absolute Proof 
 
Before discussing Meillassoux’s aporetic treatment of the sign and some of its consequences, let 
us first inspect the proof of the existence of the absolute given in his book After Finitude, which 
indeed may be said to ground an entire philosophical movement which implicitly assumes access 
to such an absolute. That Meillassoux is both the only philosopher in this movement who has 
attempted an actual proof and indicated the unresolved issues related to this proof in the field of 
signification is our motive for singling out this particular philosopher for commentary. Other so-
called (speculative) realist philosophers are nevertheless vulnerable to the same arguments that 
Meillassoux’s oeuvre allows us so clearly to articulate, in the sense that they all, openly or 
implicitly, must assume his proof if calling themselves realists.7 This is all the more reason to 
take his work seriously.  
 Whereas After Finitude specifically aims to name and define a philosophical absolute, 
namely the principle of factiality and resulting necessity of contingency, I am interested not so 
much in this particular proof because it is argued from out of philosophy’s own history.8 What I 
would rather focus on is the status of mathematics (and the mathematized sciences) in the line of 
argument Meillassoux employs after positing the principle of factiality, and the aporia at which 
he arrives. I do not intend to offer a critique of his philosophical project based on the affirmation 
“that the sole point of absolute exteriority that thought encounters is that of the radical 
contingency of our own world,”9 but rather of the possible modes through which certain 
“figures,” non-trivial and necessary properties of this necessary contingency, may be thought by 
means of what he baptizes “dianoetic intuition.”10 
 For what is at stake is not an absolute tout court. What is at stake, first in After Finitude 
and then in Meillassoux’s later lectures, is a philosophical absolute that somehow would allow 
for a discourse that is outside the hold of language or consciousness on the human subject to 
which he gives the name correlationism, namely a position “disqualifying the claim that it is 
possible to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another.”11 
Correlationism naturally rejects a philosophical absolute, in the precise sense that nothing can be 
said to exist outside human consciousness or language.12 However, it also implicitly rejects a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Meillassoux explicitly makes this point in an interview with Graham Harman: “I am […] opposed to every form of 
realism that claims to challenge correlationism without striking at the root of the difficulty. […] In this case I try to 
show why the path I have taken seems necessary to me, despite its difficulty: every other path seems defective in each 
case, incapable of a true refutation of correlationism” (Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the 
Making, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2011, p. 166). 
8 It should be noted, however, that this argument proceeds using the principle of non-contradiction, which in 
Meillassoux’s work is deduced as “figure” of the necessity of contingency -- a deduction that necessarily rests on a 
mathematical definition of contradiction. We therefore believe that even the principle of factiality is not impervious to 
the line of argument below. 
9 Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition,” p. 11. Henceforth, IRR. 
10 In After Finitude, this is still called “intellectual intuition.” Cf. Ray Brassier et al., “Speculative Realism,” in R. 
Mackay (ed.), Collapse III, Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2007, p. 432. 
11 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, Ray Brassier (tr.), London, 
Continuum, 2008, p. 5. Henceforth, AF. 
12 See also the contributions of Alberto Toscano, Peter Hallward, Nathan Brown, and Adrian Johnston in the volume 
Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman (eds), The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, 
Melbourne: re.press, 2011. For an overview of the current state of the (speculative) realist movement, refer to Michael 
Austin et al. (eds.), Speculations IV, Brooklyn: Punctum Books, 2013. 
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discourse of the absolute. And it is on this point that Meillassoux’s problem of demarcation 
appears most clearly.  
 After the deduction of the principle of factiality, Meillassoux’s argument proceeds with 
the proof of the absolute necessity of contingency, implying that physical laws “could actually 
change at any moment for no reason whatsoever” (AF 83). This seems initially to be a 
counterintuitive result, because we observe on a daily basis that the laws of nature seem quite 
stable, at least since beginning of scientific recording on this planet. Meillassoux’s 
counterargument to this objection departs from a reformulation of Hume’s problem, namely how 
to prove the necessity of causal connections, or, in other words, the necessity of the stability of 
physical laws. Meillassoux reverses this problem by asking “how we are to explain the manifest 
stability of physical laws given that we take these to be contingent” (AF 92). The core of his 
argument is a distinction he draws up between randomness or aleatory distribution (which always 
implies a certain totalization of all possibilities in the universe) and contingency as such. The 
contingency of physical laws does not imply constant disorder and chaos in the universe, because 
such reasoning “extend[s] the probabilistic reasoning which the gambler applied to an event that 
is internal to our universe (the throw of the dice and its result), to the universe as such” (AF 97). 
Meillassoux differentiates his concept of contingency from this type of aleatory reasoning by 
positing “a precise condition for the manifest stability of chaos” (AF 101). He indeed locates such 
a condition, namely under the Cantorian concept of the transfinite. 
 It is here mathematics is called upon to support Meillassoux’s argument for the absolute 
necessity of contingency philosophically, in a move that Peter Hallward calls the “Cantorian 
trump card.”13 As Hallward indicates, the cornerstone of Meillassoux’s proof is Cantor’s 
mathematical proof of the non-totalizability of number, or the proof of the existence of transfinite 
numbers:  
 
The argument that allows Meillassoux to posit a radically open miraculous [i.e. absolute] time depends 
on reference to Cantor’s “de-totalization” of every attempt to close or limit a denumerable set of 
possibilities. A still more absolute lack of mediation, however, seems to characterize Meillassoux’s 
appeal to mathematics as the royal road to the in-itself.14  
 
Hallward thus accuses Meillassoux of importing mathematics into philosophy without paying 
heed to the status of mathematics as such. Even though “No-one denies that every mathematics 
measurement is ‘indifferent’ to the thing it measures,”15 it is precisely this “indifference” of 
mathematics that should be questioned, because this indifference disappears at the moment that 
mathematics -- and this is what is at stake in Meillassoux’s argument -- enters philosophy.16 
Moreover, we should attend to the fact that only a specific axiomatization of Cantor’s set theory 
allows for a “definitive” proof of transfinite sets, and that nothing within mathematics favors such 
an axiomatization. Moreover, as Kurt Gödel has pointed out, any axiomatization necessarily 
involves a decision that itself is beyond the axiomatic schema.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Peter Hallward, “Anything Is Possible: A Reading of Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude,” in The Speculative 
Turn, p. 133. 
14 Ibidem, p. 139. Similar arguments are made by Adrian Johnston, “Hume’s Revenge: À Dieu, Meillassoux,” in The 
Speculative Turn, p. 105-106, and Ray Brassier et al., op. cit., p. 331-333. 
15 Ibid. 
16 A similar argument is made, albeit with a different motivation, in Alexander R. Galloway, “The Poverty of 
Philosophy: Realism and Post-Fordism,” Critical Inquiry 39.2, Winter 2013, 360ff. E.g., “The point is not that math is 
unable to discourse about reality. Obviously it can. Rather the point is that one cannot be neutral on the question of 
math’s ability to discourse about reailty” (p. 362). One cannot be neutral because math’s discoursing about reality is 
precisely something that only happens in philosophy. An observation similar to Galloway’s -- namely that there is an 
affinity between speculative realism’s depreciation of the human and the logic of capitalism -- can also be located in 
Reza Negarestani, “Drafting the Inhuman: Conjectures on Capitalism and Organic Necrocracy,” in The Speculative 
Turn. 
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 Although Meillassoux is explicit about his indebtedness to Badiou’s work for the 
formulation of this refutation of aleatory reason through Cantor’s proof of the transfinite, the 
relation between mathematics and philosophy, in contrast to Badiou, remains less articulated.17 
This poses an interpretative problem at the moment when we read Meillassoux’s “translation” of 
Cantor’s transfinite: “the (quantifiable) totality of the thinkable is unthinkable” (AF 104). 
Whereas in Badiou’s case truth is that which is absolute, and something which can only be 
philosophically grasped by means of a poetic interruption of the mathematically monotonous 
“planes of boredom,” in Meillassoux it is precisely mathematics itself that furnishes the discourse 
of a philosophical positing of the absolute -- without the Badiouan caveat that philosophy merely 
“cites” mathematics; thus mathematics drives the speculative argument home. Little wonder then, 
that the crux of Meillassoux’s entire enterprise becomes the formulation of a theory of 
signification that would differentiate the mathematical from the philosophical, non-mathematical 
sign -- or reestablish the field in which this differentiation is supposed to take place. And 
characteristically, he chooses for the latter option. 
 
 
The Aporia of the Kenotype 
 
We may approach Meillassoux’s theory of signification first by referring to two problematic 
statements found in the first chapter of After Finitude. On the question “What then would be a 
literal interpretation of the ancestral statement?,” he answers: “The belief that the realist meaning 
of the ancestral statement is its ultimate meaning -- that there is no other regime of meaning 
capable of deepening our understanding of it” (AF 14). This is later enforced by the claim that 
“an ancestral statement only has sense if its literal sense is also its ultimate sense” (AF 17). This 
is a staunchly anti-metaphorical position, suggesting that a statement such as “The accretion of 
the earth happened 4.56 billion years ago” has no other meaning except for the accumulation of 
scientific, mathemeticized data it somehow represents.18 Another way for Meillassoux to refer to 
such meaning are the syntagm “as described,” or even simply “sense”:  
 
Correlationism will generally maintain […] that ancestral statements are true in a way […]. But if it is 
consistent, correlationism will have to deny that the referents of these statements really existed as 
described prior to any human or living species. […] But this assertion is, of course, a catastrophe, 
because it destroys the sense of scientific statements, which, I insist, just mean what they mean[.]19 
 
Within the historical categorization sketched out above we may thus conclude that in his 
philosophy, Meillassoux has found a way of distinguishing signs more mathematico. He posits 
“ultimate meaning,” “(ultimate) sense” and “as described” as necessary attributes of absolute 
statements. 20But the question remains: what comes first, the proof of the absolute and then 
statements in which it is articulated, or ancestral statements that furnish the basis for the proof of 
the absolute necessity of contingency? 
 The problem that now has to be addressed is how exactly Meillassoux is able to 
demarcate the mathematical from the non-mathematical sign, because the moments at which he 
attempts such demarcation in After Finitude, it does not withstand close scrutiny. For example, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Meillassoux indeed claims that his role as philosopher is “to prevent a certain philosophical regime from contesting 
the sovereignty of those ‘disciplines of experience’” (IRR 12). The limit case is here obviously mathematics. 
18 Cf. Hallward, op. cit.,  p. 140. In his reply to Hallward, Nathan Brown argues in defense of Meillassoux that the latter 
doesn’t “stretch […] his arguments beyond the proper domain of their application” (Nathan Brown, “The Speculative 
and the Specific: On Hallward and Meillassoux,” in The Speculative Turn, p. 145). Nevertheless Meillassoux does 
precisely this when he speaks of the “ultimate sense,” a sense (and probably non-sense) that is only available within 
mathematics itself and nowhere in the sentence he gives us. 
19 Quentin Meillassoux, “Time without Becoming,” lecture at Middlesex University, May 8, 2008. 
20 Cf. Nathan Brown, op. cit., p. 160. 
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Meillassoux’s discussion of the differentiation between primary and secondary qualities, he 
suggests that 
 
Rather than arguing that mathematics and physics only bear on the a priori forms of our experience, I 
am convinced […] that one must maintain, like Descartes, that mathematics and mathematized physics 
give us means to identify the properties of a world that is radically independent of thought. (IRR 18) 
 
In order to keep his access to a proof of a philosophical absolute, Meillassoux needs to be able to 
distinguish mathematical statements from other statements -- including all his speculative 
pronouncements. He addresses this issue on several occasions, for example at the end of his 
lecture “Time without Becoming”: “Would it be possible to derive, to draw from the principle of 
factiality, the ability of the natural sciences to know, by way of mathematical discourse, reality in 
itself, […] which exists independently of our subjectivity.”21 The possibility of a deriving 
scientific knowledge from the absolute principle factiality thus depends on the stability of this 
“mathematical discourse.” 
 This stability, or legibility, of the mathematical sign is what is at stake at the end of 
Meillassoux’s lecture “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition.” In this text he attempts to “obtain a 
factial derivation that would legitimate the absolutizing capacity of modern science” (IRR 18), a 
derivation that would somehow certify his usage of “absolute meaning” and “literal sense” in 
previous arguments. He formulates his approach to this derivation as follows:  
 
I will try to exhibit a minimal condition […] of various contemporary formal languages -- logical as 
well as mathematical. This minimal condition […] has to do with our capacity to think a meaningless 
sign. I will then derive this capacity to think a meaningless sign from the principle of factiality, by 
showing that there is an essential link between this sort of sign and absolutized contingency. (IRR 18) 
 
The meaningless sign, posited as that which differentiates formal from natural languages, thus 
becomes, in Meillassoux’s terminology, a figure of the principle of factiality. From an inspection 
of the axiomatics of set theory he subsequently derives a principle of distinction, namely “that a 
formal language, unlike a natural language, accords a structural role to the meaningless sign -- at 
least on a syntactical level” (IRR 22). It is indeed well attested that many contemporary 
mathematical axiomatics no longer define certain signs, but just activate a certain operability in 
them, through which meaning appears ex nihilo by means of certain syntactical operations. This 
differentiation between the properties of signs in formal and natural languages in itself is not 
problematic, but the way in which we would be able to recognize meaningless signs as different 
from meaningful signs is, especially since it is in philosophy that this recognition is supposed to 
take place: “It is precisely because hermeneutics has access only to the regime of ordinary 
meaning that it cannot accede to any speculative absolute; only a philosophy capable of thinking 
formal meaning and its crucial non-signifying aspect can hope to extract it from a thinking of 
finitude” (IRR 23). Meillassoux therefore seeks think formal meaning and formulate “an ontology 
of the empty sign” (IRR 24). 
 The meaningless sign is the “zero degree” of the sign, neither signifying nor denoting 
anything, and Meillassoux, in a typical reversal, suggests that any speculative theory of 
signification should depart from the meaningless sign instead of attempt to incorporate it within 
existing semiotic frameworks. In taking up the type-token distinction formulated in modern 
linguistics, Meillassoux suggests that recognizing a meaningless sign means to divide in its 
(keno)type and actual occurrence. He thus separates the material part (written or spoken trace) of 
the meaningless sign from the immaterial part (kenotype). This kenotype-occurrence duality (as 
special variant of the type-token duality) would be different from the regular concept-thing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Meillassoux, “Time without Becoming.” My emphasis. Cf. also Ray Brassier et al., op. cit., p. 330. 
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duality in the sense that it always, necessarily, implies an infinite number of occurrences -- “the 
sign does not at all conceptualize its material basis” (IRR 28) -- as well as an infinite number of 
recodings of such occurrences -- “the sign […] is not essentially or conceptually linked to the 
form that it takes for us” (IRR 28). The question of recognition, however, remains. How to 
differentiate the two regimes of sameness, finitely repeatable sameness between things and 
infinitely iterable sameness between tokens.  
 At this point, Meillassoux has recourse to a “fable” -- not the most neutral of 
philosophical forms -- entitled “The Fable of the Contented Paleographer.” Meillassoux’s initial 
observation is a fundamental one. He suggests that on inspecting two rows of marks (IRR 30): 
 
§§§§§§§§ 
++++++++ 
 
The shift in recognition between interpreting these marks as a finite repetition of decorative 
elements or as a sample from an infinite iteration of meaningless signs, we grasp the kenotype, a 
sign before any signification: “Now, it is precisely at the moment when we flip from the grasping 
of contingent things to the grasping of the contingency of things […] that we immediately iterate 
them without limit” (IRR 35-36). And he concludes: 
 
The grasping of the sign proceeds from a switching of our mode of apprehension -- from the ordinary 
mode of apprehension that grasps certain contingent things, I switch to the semiotic mode of 
apprehension, that grasps the eternal contingency of this or that thing. This grasping of a facticity other 
than the empirical […] makes it possible for me to iterate identically marks brought together 
conventionally as replicas of distinct type-signs. (IRR 37) 
 
But the shift between the “ordinary” mode and “semiotic” mode is in itself not as clearcut as 
Meillassoux wants us to believe with his fable. We could point to an entire tradition that exploits 
this switching of apprehension. Asemic writing, which originally developed from calligraphic 
traditions in both the East and the West, consists precisely in suspending the difference between 
Meillassoux’s modes. A paleographer, encountering for example any of Henri Michaux’s 
signes,22 would never conclusively be able to decide what she is dealing with, iteration or 
repetition. Moreover, it remains unclear to what extent this shift is different or comparable to 
experiences of momentary illegibility, for example when a nonsense string of characters in one 
language suddenly becomes meaningful in another, a relatable experience for anyone operating in 
multilingual environments. 
 However, the actual problem, namely the philosophical demarcation between the 
mathematical and the non-mathematical sign, remains unsolved.23 This is indeed acknowledged at 
the end of Meillassoux’s lecture: “How, through what paradox, can we hope that the meaningless 
sign could not only have a referent, but a (deutero-)absolute referent, more radically separate 
from us than any correlational apprehension?” (IRR 37). This question specifically tailored to 
Meillassoux’s line of argument resonates with the general problem of philosophy’s relation to 
language, as previously formulated poignantly by Derrida: “is philosophical discourse governed -
- to what extent and according to what modalities -- by the constraints of language? […] Has not 
philosophy always recalled the arbitrariness of the sign in order to posit the contingent and 
superficial exteriority of language to thought […]?”24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Cf. Catherine de Zegher (ed.), Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, New York: Merrell/The Drawing Center, 2000. 
23 And in that sense Meillassoux is not yet immune from “Rortian refutation.” Cf. Brassier et al, “Speculative Realism,” 
p. 331. 
24 Jacques Derrida, “The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics,” in Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass 
(tr.), Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 177-178. 
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 Allow me to insist that this unsolved philosophical problem continues to threaten the 
entire philosophical construct built on the proof of the absolute, and most immediately the 
deduction of any of its figures such as the principle of non-contradiction. To put the pending 
problem in his own terms: he may have succeeded in providing philosophy with a “Real,” but it is 
the “realism” that remains of dubious consistency.25 
 
 
From Signification to Symbolization 
 
Considering this aporia, it perhaps doesn’t come as a surprise that in his latest work, Le Nombre 
et la sirène,26 Meillassoux attempts a derivation of another figure of the necessity of contingency, 
what he calls the peut-être -- may-being,27 through poetry: “Comme ce qui fait, non plus l’être, 
mais du peut-être, la tâche première, et à venir, des penseurs et des poètes.”28 We have thus come 
full circle, from an approach to philosophical problems more mathematico to an approach which, 
if anything, is congruent with the best hermetic traditions, including the counting of words and 
extracting universal meaning from numbers. It is this attempt at a thinking together of the mos 
mathematicus and mos hermeticus that Meillassoux’s work should be situated,29 while at the same 
time radically differentiated from other “realisms.” For, paradoxically, Meillassoux’s proof of the 
absolute is utterly worthless in the eyes of anyone actually interested in articulating parliaments 
of things or weirding the universe.  
 For in his practice Meillassoux proceeds by any language necessary, mathematical or 
poetical, emptied from any meaning and as meaningful as possible. In this sense, he becomes an 
advocate of the power of language. Any speculative theory of signification should necessarily be 
affirmative of language as such and through Meillassoux’s turn from the fable to the poem we 
grasp that much more than a demarcation between mathematical and non-mathematical signs, it is 
a matter of intensifying the productivity of both, as well as an investigation of the “great 
outdoors” of signification that remain unthought, namely the possibility of the undifferentiated 
coexistence of the mathematical and poetic sign. 
 Realist philosophers are captured by a disavowal of this power of language itself, a power 
which, paradoxically, appears in the very same author that formulates the only proof by which 
they support their disavowal. Their incapacity to invent new languages, which goes hand in hand 
with their disdain for poetry and an absence of any political commitment,30 thus blinds them to 
the decision that lies in front of them, a properly philosophical decision: how to unify 
signification more mathematico and more hermetico without any mediating term -- that is, 
without Badiou’s citational mode of philosophy.   
 Allow me to close on a possible avenue how to think this question with the work of 
Meillassoux. In his as yet unpublished doctoral dissertation L’Inexistance divine (The Divine 
Inexistence), he develops the concept of “symbolization,” which hurls us back to one of the first 
formulations of a philosophical theory of signification: ἔστι µὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ 
ψυχῇ παθηµάτων σύµβολα…31 But for Meillassoux symbolization would not be the throwing 
together of sounds and the sensations of the soul, or the coherence of signifier and signified in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Cf. Brassier et al, op. cit., p. 434-435. 
26 Quentin Meillassoux, Le Nombre et la sirène: Un déchiffrage du Coup de dés de Mallarmé, Paris: Fayard, 2011. 
27 Cf. Meillassoux, “Time and Becoming”: “I think that ultimately the matter of philosophy is not being or becoming, 
representation or reality, but a very special possibility, which is not a formal possible, but a real and dense possible, 
which I call the ‘peut-être’.” 
28 Meillassoux, Le Nombre et la sirène, 206. 
29 A similar observation is made in Thomas H. Ford’s review of the English translation, The Number and the Siren: A 
Decipherment of Mallarmé’s Coup de dés”: http://www.c-scp.org/en/2013/01/06/quentin-meillassoux-the-number-and-
the-siren.html.  
30 Cf. Galloway, op. cit., 365. 
31 Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 16a3-4. 
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sign, but rather an immanent bond, the “relation of values with the truth of this world […] The 
goal of every philosophy must be the immanent inscription of values in being.”32 Thus it is 
philosophy’s principle task to create “symbols,” to invent structures of signification. We can now 
start to understand why the problem of signification seems to be at the problematic core of 
Meillassoux’s argument on the necessity of contingency: it is signification (that is, symbolization) 
itself that binds his entire philosophical project together -- the way in which mathematics could 
say something about a “world radically independent of thought,” the way in which a poem may 
give us a unique “Number.” 
 This project (and I must abbreviate here to a perhaps irresponsible degree) consists in 
articulating a non-metaphysical, “factial Symbol,” which, after the collapse of all previous 
attempts of philosophy to link being and justice -- the most recent of which was the “historic 
Symbol” which deposits objective value in history itself and articulates economy as its teleology 
(DI 201-2) -- would relink being and justice under the immanent necessity of contingency: 
 
The factial proposes a new symbolization, the first non-metaphysical one. For this time the 
symbolization is made possible by seizing the radical contingency of worldly laws: a contingency that 
allows us to found ontologically the hope of justice even while overcoming the former weakening of 
justice. Value is inserted into a reality no longer identified with a determinate and perennial substance, 
but rather with the possibility of lawless change. In this way we do not propose that the world is the best 
or worst of possible worlds, but that it can actually be both the one and the other. Thus, we do not 
abandon our disquietude in the face of the world, but maintain it as a constitutive element of hope (DI 
206). 
In the face of this “new symbolization,” the difference between signification more hermetico and 
more mathematico vanishes, as both assume a certain form of transcendence. Therefore, the 
articulation of this Symbol may come about through any language necessary, or, perhaps -- to 
avoid any further attachment to the sign as unit of meaning, through any “fiction.” And it is at this 
point, ironically, that Meillassoux comes closest in actualizing Heidegger’s dream of the 
“liberation of language from grammar into a more original essential framework […] reserved for 
thought and poetic creation.”33 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Quentin Meillassoux, “Excerpts from L’Inexistence divine,” Graham Harman (tr.), in Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 
p. 195. Henceforth, DI. 
33 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” Frank Capuzzi (tr.), in Basic Writings, David Farrell Krell, New York: 
HarperCollins, 1993, p. 218. 
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